Ensuring the physical layer security (PHY-security) of millimeter-wave (mmWave) communications is one of the key factors for the success of 5G. Recent field measurements show that conventional fading models cannot accurately model the random fluctuations of mmWave signals. To tackle this challenge, the fluctuating two-ray (FTR) fading model has been proposed. In this correspondence, we comprehensively analyze the PHY-security in mmWave communications over FTR fading channels. More specifically, we derive analytical expressions for significant PHYsecurity metrics, such as the average secrecy capacity, the secrecy outage probability, and the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity, with simple functions. The effect of channel parameters on the PHY-security has been validated by numerical results.
ied in [3] . In [4] , PHY-security transmissions under slow fading channels with multipath propagation in mmWave communications were studied. However, both [3] and [4] neglected the small-scale fading of mmWave channel. Leveraging on a stochastic geometry framework, the authors of [5] investigated the downlink PHY-security performance in an mmWave cellular network assuming Nakagami-m fading. Moreover, the PHY-security performance of hybrid mmWave networks has been investigated in [6] , [7] .
Most of works only pay attention to the PHY-security in mmWave communications over slow fading channels. The small-scale channel model is also important for taking a deeper look into signal processing for mmWave communications, such as beamforming and precoding. Very recently, a 28 GHz outdoor measurement campaign showed that conventional small-scale fading models [8] (e.g., Rayleigh, Rician and Nakagami-m) cannot accurately model the random fluctuations suffered by mmWave signals [9] . In order to circumvent this issue, the fluctuating two-ray (FTR) fading model proposed in [10] can capture the bimodality of mmWave channels, which is more accurate than conventional fading models.
Therefore, the PHY-security performance of mmWave communications over FTR fading channels is still a significant and unsolved problem. Motivated by that, we provide a further investigation on the comprehensive analysis of the PHY-security performance of mmWave communications and derive analytical exact expressions for the average secrecy capacity (ASC), the secrecy outage probability (SOP), and the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC). Since the FTR includes Rayleigh, Rician, and Nakagami-m as special cases, the derived results can reduce to many pioneering works. Moreover, our work is beneficial to evaluate the state of the art PHY-security techniques and get better insight into the application of the FTR fading models in practical mmWave communications.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Hereafter, we consider the classic Wyner's wiretap model, which has been widely applied in the PHY-security analysis for mmWave communications [5]- [7] , [11] . Suppose that the source S sends a message to the legitimate receiver D over the main channel while the eavesdropper E attempts to decode this message from its received signal through the eavesdropper channel. It is assumed that the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent FTR fading. Furthermore, we assume that the full channel state information (CSI) of both main and eavesdropper channels is available at S.
A. FTR Channel Model
The FTR channel model consists of two fluctuating specular components with random phases plus a diffuse component, and incorporates ground reflections in mmWave channels [10] . The probability distribution function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) over FTR channel are 0018-9545 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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expressed as [12] 
where i ∈ {D, E} represents the main channel or the eavesdropper channel, d j i is expressed in terms of the fading parameters m i , K i and Δ i , defined in [12, Eq. (9) ], and γ (·, ·) is the incomplete gamma function [13, Eq. (8.350.1) ]. The performance of mmWave links is also affected by large-scale blockages, such as buildings, in urban areas. Several past research works, e.g. [14] and references therein, have pointed out that blockages result in significant differences between the path loss characteristics of the line-of-sight (LOS) and the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) components. In [14] , the so-called LoS ball blockage model has been considered which approximates general LOS probability functions as a step function to render mathematical analysis tractable. According to this model, the LOS probability of the link equals to one within a certain sphere of fixed radius R B and zero elsewhere. Assuming that the propagation distance, r i , lies within this sphere, the average SNR at D or E is given asγ
where E b /N 0 is the energy per bit to the noise power spectral density ratio, η i is path-loss exponent, and 2σ 2 i is the average power of the diffuse component over the FTR fading.
B. Truncation Error
By truncating (1) up to the first N i + 1 terms, the truncation error is given asf
The truncation error of the area under the f i (γ i ) to the first N i + 1 terms is given by
Substituting (1) and (4) into (5) and with the help of [13, Eq. (8.312.2)], (5) can be expressed in closed-form as
Table I depicts the statistic truncation parameter N i for different combinations of channel parameters. Note that the maximum required term for accurate N i is only 27 in all considered cases. In the realistic propagation environment, the main channel and the eavesdropper channel may have different fading parameters, which results different values of truncation parameters. In this case, we define the truncation parameter N as N max{N D , N E }. 
A. ASC Analysis
Recall that the full CSI of both the main and eavesdropper channels is available at S, which is called as active eavesdropping [15] . In such a scenario, S can adapt the achievable secrecy rate to R s such that R s ≤ C s . Thus, according to [16] , the instantaneous secrecy capacity is defined as
where ln (1 + γ D ) and ln (1 + γ E ) are the capacity of the main and eavesdropper channels, respectively. Since both main and eavesdropper channels experience independent fading, the ASC can be given bȳ
where
is the joint pdf of γ D and γ E . With the help of (1), (2) and (8), we can obtain the ASC over FTR fading channels in the following Lemma. Lemma 1: The ASC over FTR fading channels can be expressed as (10) at the bottom of the next page, where
Proof: Please see Appendix A. Note that (9) is given in terms of only simple functions, which can be efficiently evaluated in common softwares.
B. SOP Analysis
When S has no information about the eavesdroppers channel, S has no choice but to encode the confidential data into codewords of a constant rate R s . If R s C s , perfect secrecy can be achieved and information theoretic security is compromised. The SOP is defined as the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity falls below a target rate, which is an important PHY-security performance metric and widely used to characterize wireless communications. The SOP can be expressed as [17] 
where R s 0 is the target secrecy capacity threshold, and Θ e R s . Substituting (1) and (2) into (11), we can obtain the SOP over FTR fading channels in the following Lemma. Lemma 2: The SOP over FTR fading channels can be expressed as
Proof: Please see Appendix B. By adopting a similar method in [18] , we derive the lower bound of the SOP based on (11) as
Substituting (1) and (2) into (13), the lower bound of the SOP over FTR fading channels is derived in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3: The lower bound of the SOP over FTR fading channels can be expressed as
where ρ
C. SPSC Analysis
The probability of SPSC, which is a fundamental benchmark in secure communications, can be obtained by [17] Therefore, we can obtain SPSC by substituting (14) into (15) and setting Θ = e R s = 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some plots that illustrate the ASC, SOP and SPSC of mmWave communications over FTR fading channels with. For the Monte Carlo simulation, 10 6 realizations of FTR fading channels are generated to validate the analytical expressions derived in previous sections and the propagation distance r i is normalized to 1 km.
The ASC as a function ofγ D in dB is depicted in Fig. 1 forγ E = 3, 6, 9 dB. The outputs of a Monte Carlo simulator are shown to exactly match with the analytical results, which validates our derived results. As expected, the performance of ASC improves with increasingγ D or decreasingγ E . Note that the ASC will fall to zero if the average SNR of the main channel is smaller than the eavesdropper channel (γ D <γ E ), which is consistent with (7) .
In Fig. 2 , we portray the exact and the lower bound of SOP as a function of the average SNR of the eavesdropper channelγ E . The high-SNRs ofγ E make the lower bound of the SOP sufficiently tight with the exact SOP. It is clear that the lower bound of SOP becomes accurate as the value of R s decreases. Moreover, it can be observed that the SOP performance of the considered system is improved by decreasing the values ofγ E , which is consistent with the results presented in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. Fig. 3 investigates the impact of the ratios betweenγ D andγ E , ρ, on the SOP performance. The achievable secrecy rates R s are considered (R s = 1, 2, 3, 4 bit/s/Hz). Intuitively, as ρ become large, the main channel is much better than the eavesdropper channel and the SOP becomes decreasingly substantial. In addition, smaller R s can obtain smaller SOP, which is consistent with the results presented in Lemma 2. Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of shadowing on the SPSC performance of mmWave communications over FTR fading channels. As can be readily observed, the light shadowing (small values of m) in eavesdropper channel will increase the SPSC. Furthermore, in the moderate-and high-ρ regime, increasing the shadowing effect of the main channel m D can increase the SPSC performance, which is not observed in the very low-ρ regime.
V. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence, we investigate the PHY-security performance of mmWave communications over FTR fading channels. We derive analytical expressions for the ASC, SOP and SPSC in terms of simple functions, which can quickly and steadily converge with only a few of N terms to obtain a desired accuracy. Note that derived results can reduce to many pioneering works, since the FTR includes Rayleigh, Rician, and Nakagami-m as special cases. Our analysis validates that the performance of the considered system can be improved with increasing the average SNR of the main channel or decreasing the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel. Moreover, the light shadowing (small values of m) in eavesdropper channel will increase the SPSC. As for current and future directions, it is of interest to investigate the PHY-security performance of mmWave communications by considering more practical channel and system features, such as blockages, interference, and multi-antenna.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
For the natural number j i , the gamma function Γ (·) can be expressed as Γ (j i + 1) = j i ! [13, Eq. (8.339.1)]. Then, substituting (1) and (2) into (8), I 1 can be expressed as 
Then, we can obtain (10) by combining (19) , (20) and (21).
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting (1) and (2) into (11), we can obtain
With the help of [13, Eq. (8.354.1)], I 4 can be expressed as 
The proof concludes by combining (22)-(25).
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting (1) and (2) into (13), we can obtain
With the help of [13, Eq. (6.455.2)], I 7 can be expressed as
where 2 F 1 (·, ·; ·; ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [13, Eq. (9.14) ]. Using [20, Eq. (7.3.1.129)], the proof concludes by combining (27) and (26) with some simplifications.
